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Abstract
The Arctic as a booming oil and gas province has been a predominant geopolitical representation of
the region. However, the shale gas revolution in the United States and the drop in oil prices since late
2014 has reduced the viability of many high-cost Arctic oil and gas prospects. Little scholarly attention
has been paid to the consequences of pursued but unrealized natural resource-based projects. This
article brings literature from geography and science and technology studies into conversation to map
out a preliminary research agenda for understanding how these ‘‘shelved futures’’ are still likely to
matter in Arctic communities and policymaking. This conceptual argument is bolstered with a short
exploratory case study of Murmansk, Russia. The qualitative-interview based case study illustrates
two ways in which the Shtokman gas project retained regional significance, even three years after the
project was suspended. Specifically, these are 1) a comparatively negative assessment of the broader
socio-economic prospects of the region, and 2) expanded and possibly changed understandings on
the part of the different stakeholders (business, government, civil society/the public) about their own
and others’ potential roles. The semi-structured interviews with stakeholders primarily focused on
recollections of petroleum companies’ corporate social responsibility (CSR) efforts, as these efforts
were a concrete harbinger of the much-trumpeted oil and gas future.
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The oil and gas sector in our region is something we have. . .and don’t have. This sector’s
presence among us is somehow virtual. Nonetheless, Shtokman managed to influence our
quality of life for the better and for the worse at the same time.
Resident and businessman, Murmansk, Russia
Introduction
The notion of the Arctic as a booming oil and gas province has become one of the
strongest elite/policy representations of the region. A key number  cited extensively
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by both media and scholarly accounts  is the United States Geological Survey
estimate that the Arctic contains 25% of the world’s undiscovered petroleum
reserves.1 However, the shale gas revolution in the United States, followed by the
dramatic drop in oil prices since late 2014, has resulted in high-cost offshore oil and
gas prospects being shelved. This includes the Shtokman field in the Barents Sea
analysed in this article and, more recently, the cessation of Shell’s exploratory
activities off the Alaskan coast in the summer of 2015. The Arctic has long been a
kind of natural resource hinterland for southern metropoles and boom/bust cycles
are a feature of the economic geography of the region.
Do unrealized Arctic natural resource futures simply disappear once they cease to
be actively anticipated by communities, academics, journalists, NGOs, companies,
and government officials? Potential enduring consequences of abandoned represen-
tations of Arctic futures have thus far garnered little scholarly attention. This article
brings literature from geography and science studies into conversation in order to
map out a preliminary research agenda for understanding how ‘‘shelved futures’’ can
have enduring consequences for Arctic communities.
The article’s conceptual argument is bolstered with a preliminary, exploratory case
study of Murmansk, Russia. The interview-based case study illustrates some ways that
the unrealized Shtokman offshore gas project and a predicted petroleum-rich future
remain significant in Murmansk (a major urban capital city on the Kola Peninsula in
northwest Russia). The interview responses pointed to two ways in which the
Shtokman gas project had retained regional significance, even three years after the
project was suspended. Specifically, these are 1) a comparatively negative assessment
of the broader socio-economic prospects of the region, and 2) an expanded and
possibly changed understanding on the part of the different stakeholders (business,
government, civil society/the public) of one another’s roles.
The article first brings together a selection of literature that addresses the role of the
future in shaping the present, with particular attention paid to efforts to analyse the
consequences of futures that fail to come to fruition. The literature review prepares
the ground for understanding how an anticipation of shelved futures matters for the
present nonetheless. The review also frames the argument that the politics of
anticipation may be a particularly intense aspect of the socioeconomic fabric of life
in the natural-resource dependent market economies of the circumpolar North. An
illustrative case study and the methods applied in gathering and interpreting the
interview set are then presented.
Anticipation and the unbuilt environment of Arctic offshore petroleum
development
Since the early 2000s, there has been increasing international scrutiny, and at times
great enthusiasm, about the possibility of a surge in large-scale natural resource
extraction in the Arctic region. The notion of the Arctic as a booming oil and gas
province has become one of the strongest elite/policy representations of the region, as
a number of critical geopolitical studies have noted.2 Furthermore, although nearly
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all Arctic policymakers and researchers easily acknowledge that commodity markets
fluctuate, scholarly and policy emphasis has been on the positive and negative
consequences of a natural resource boom, rather than on the possibility of a ‘‘bust’’
(the absence or abatement of resource extraction interest).3
Intense anticipation of a region-specific petroleum future is probably related to a
long tradition of Arctic exceptionalism (e.g. that the Arctic will have its own unique
future distinct from global or national futures).4 Heightened attention to the future of
the circumpolar region is also likely to stem from the immense uncertainty and magni-
tude of physical transformation predicted in the region due to global climate change.5
However, anticipating and planning for the future figures into contemporary
governance and modern capitalism in all parts of the world, not just the Arctic. The
last century has seen an attendant rise of institutions (consultancies, think tanks) and
methods (scenarios, Delphi, forecasting) tasked with considering various futures and
mapping the routes to desirable versus less desirable ones.6 Literature in science and
technology studies directs our attention to the idea that envisioning futures is more
about predicting right or guessing wrong. The future is a representation and  like all
representations  is an object constructed by inclusions, exclusions and power
relations, and the ideological and cognitive commitments behind these choices.7
One can thus ask the question why one particular version or vision of the future is
promoted or adopted above other possible versions of the future. In terms of the Arctic, for
example, an important avenue for research would be to understand how and why specific
visions of the future are actively promoted and by whom and towhom. Thiswould allow us
to take a cue from discourse analysis and identify the power relations and ideological
commitments that undergird any representation, including those of the future.
Another avenue for research is to ask, as this article does: how might anticipation of
the future result in temporary or enduring changed practices or understandings? The
generative impacts of the future on the present are of particular interest in the fields of
scientific and technological innovation. This literature traces how expectations or ideas
about the future can morph into concrete anticipatory practices, like changed
infrastructure planning, new science and innovation funding programmes, and the
production of new disciplines and educational programmes, all of which make an
anticipated future more likely to come about.8 Concrete anticipation of a particular
future may also result in changes manifested in social relations and understandings. As
Birch, Levidow and Papaioannou9 find in the case of the European pharmaceutical
markets, particular versions of the future and concrete preparations for them may also
change understandings of the capacity and responsibilities of potential actors and
stakeholders, as well as change the relations between them.
Anticipated, yet unrealized, major economic development projects  and the regulatory,
stakeholder/participatory, business and scientific processes that attend them  can be seen
as resulting in ‘‘unbuilt environments’’.10 Most notably, this concept has been explored by
historical geographer Jonathan Peyton in his study of a planned  but not implemented 
hydroelectric dam project in British Columbia. He documented longstanding discursive
consequences for how the watershed landscape was understood locally, and material
traces left by exploratory infrastructure.11 These included new roads into the watershed,
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transformed understandings of the kind of expert knowledge relevant to landscape-
changing projects, and new local/regional patterns of social mobilization around
environmental issues more broadly.
Thus, in terms of the concrete consequences and practices of unrealized projects,
one would expect to find traces of the unbuilt environment in the advance
infrastructure for oil and gas, as well as the budgetary and regulatory processes
shaped by the anticipation and mobilization of the social, economic and political
opportunities and challenges associated with large-scale petroleum development.
The research above, and the exploratory case study presented below, also remind us
that we should remain alert to more subtle changes, including altered or more clearly
defined understandings of specific potential stakeholders in natural resource
development or changed relations between key actors.
CSR, Shtokman and the Kola Peninsula
The population of the Kola Peninsula, with most of its territory north of the Arctic
Circle, grew massively from 23,000 residents in 1927 to one million by the end of the
Soviet period.12 Much of the region’s development was formed under Stalin’s
staggering ‘‘revolution from above’’, involving an expansion of the industrial resource
base that prompted the exploration and subsequent incorporation of the Soviet
Arctic into the socialist production system (osvoenie severa)13 and the subsequent
transformation of Sami lifestyles on the peninsula.14 Key industries in the region are
based on mineral resources and shipbuilding, both of which have proven to be
relatively stable bases of production and employment throughout the upheavals of
the post-Soviet period. Consequently, the region did not see the same dramatic out-
migration that other heavily subsidized northern federal areas experienced after the
collapse of the Soviet Union.15
Offshore oil and gas development, like the Shtokman field that created so much buzz in
Murmansk, involves new technologies and novel conglomerations of international
companies. However, it is important to keep in mind that the Russian Arctic remains
the most industrialized and urbanized part of the Arctic.16 As we will see below, new
understandings about roles and responsibilities generated by the unrealized Shtokman-gas
future of the region are in close conversation with the respondents’ prior experience with
other major economic actors in the extractive industries.
The Shtokman gas field, located in the Barents Sea some 600 km north of the
shores of the Kola Peninsula, is one of the world’s largest natural gas fields. The
prospect of developing the Shtokman field was first earnestly pursued in the early to
mid-1990s, with letters of intent signed at various points with a variety of
international oil companies, and shifting placement of Russia’s state-owned
companies at the lead of the initiative. In 2005, cooperation agreements to develop
the field were signed by Russia and Norway, and Russia and France, with Gazprom




What ensued can be described as a ‘‘beauty pageant’’, with companies seeking to
present in the best possible light their competence (including CSR and local relations),
financing and willingness to accept downward bargaining on contract terms.18
Eventually, Statoil and Total joined a consortium with Gazprom called the Shtokman
Development AG in 2008. However, exploration never got off the ground. The ‘‘shale
revolution’’ in the US drove gas prices down in what had been a target market for
liquefied natural gas from the Shtokman field.19 The shareholder agreement expired in
July 2012. The costly and challenging nature of the project makes Shtokman a
daunting prospect for any company operating in today’s gas markets.
In the interview set that forms the basis of the illustrative case presented below,
emphasis was placed on eliciting interviewees’ recollections and perceptions of
corporate social responsibility efforts. The focus on CSR engagement was chosen as
CSR activities were one of the few concrete forerunners beyond journalistic or political
hype of the now shelved Shtokman project. The article does not aspire to cover the
breadth of CSR activities, nor to judge their efficacy or appropriateness. It is also worth
noting that there is no one set definition of CSR, which is best understood as a term
encompassing many aspects of society-state-industry relations.20 CSR practices vary
across companies, locations and projects, and represent a complex field of possible
standards against which to judge company behaviour.21
As we will see below, respondents’ expectations and perceptions of oil and gas
companies were based upon their own experiences, and through comparison to CSR
practices elsewhere in Russia.22 Their impressions were also based on experience
with other major industrial actors (mining and metallurgy, for example), which
historically have been expected to fulfil economic, political and social mandates
simultaneously.23
Furthermore, the standards against which several interviewees evaluated the companies
active in the Shtokman project were of an international variety, drawing upon what they
had heard or seen of petroleum projects elsewhere in the European Arctic. Gorbachev held
a famous 1987 speech on the rosy prospects for Arctic cooperation in Murmansk, and the
city became a focal point of post-Cold War cross-border cooperation. For example, under
the regional Barents cooperation in the European North, the flow of visitors across the
Norwegian-Russian border grew from 300 in the early 1990s to nearly 110 000 a decade
later.24 It is against this international regional backdrop that the perceptions and
recollections shared by interviewees about their petroleum future were partly formed.
Methods
This article’s conceptual argument is supported by an illustrative case of recollec-
tions on the Shtokman project. This draws upon a small-scale, exploratory set of
qualitative interviews collected in Murmansk in April 2013. The author, in
cooperation with Dr. Natalya Metanovskaya, conducted 20 semi-structured inter-
views in Russian with government officials, company representatives, indigenous and
civil society representatives, and a random sampling of ‘‘everyday citizens’’ without a
direct connection to the oil and gas industry (see Appendix 1).
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Emphasis was placed on companies’ social engagement and CSR policies, as this is
one of the few concrete, early manifestations of the broader framing of the Arctic as
an oil and gas province. Interviewees were asked about how they envisioned the
future of the region, as well as how they judged the petroleum companies’ CSR
efforts. Frequently, this formal Russian translation of a foreign concept elicited no
response, so many questions were rephrased to emphasize the social and environ-
mental roles and obligations of businesses more generally. Notes were taken during
the interviews and immediately written up after the interview into a more thorough
Russian-language summary of what had been said.
Interview transcripts were then coded using keywords generated from context.
Generating the keywords involved an initial read-through of all interview transcripts
with the aim of identifying repeated themes. Interview statements with the same
topic code were then aggregated. This allowed for consideration of contradictory
statements about the same topic and assessment of the extent to which interviewees’
statements were outlying highly individualized opinions or part of a broader
intersubjective understanding. For example, more interviewees making similar
statements or using similar examples under the ‘‘sustainable development’’ or
‘‘regional government’s role’’ codes pointed to such a broader understanding. The
assignment of interview numbers to the interviews conducted, contributes to
transparency, allowing the reader to assess the level of cross-interview agreement
(or lack thereof) around particular opinions and perspectives selected from the
interview transcripts.
A key limitation of the exploratory interview set is that the interviews were
primarily conducted in a regional capital and not in the areas directly impacted by
advance, preparatory work for the Shtokman field infrastructure, such as the village
of Teriberka. However, as the regional seat of government, civil society and
commerce, Murmansk was an ideal location in which to explore if and how broader
stakeholder relations (regional residents, NGOs and indigenous organizations, the
wider public and regional government) had been shaped by the shelving of the
region’s petroleum future.
Although outside the scope of this article and its exploratory, illustrative case, it is
worth noting that the research agenda on unrealized futures outlined in this article
could (and should) rely upon different sources of empirical data to construct robust,
empirical studies of the lasting anticipatory practices and physical imprints of
unrealized major industrial projects in the Arctic. Other potential sources of data
include media coverage, blogs and social media, transcripts of community meetings
and hearings, as well as resources that help identify physical imprints (infrastructure
plans, comparative mapping, site visits). Furthermore, the interviews gathered
represent a particular temporal snapshot of the status of recollections and reflections
on the Shtokman project in 2013. A further avenue for research in Murmansk or
other ‘‘boom/bust’’ locations in the Arctic would thus be to repeat interview sets at
different time intervals to capture how the imprints of anticipatory practices are
sharpened (or dulled) by the passage of time.
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Unbuilt landscapes of expectation (and disappointment)
The unrealized future associated with the Shtokman gas project did not simply fade from
imagination when market prospects for liquefied natural gas from the Barents Sea
evaporated. Firstly, the unrealized anticipation of a petroleum-rich future of the region
seems to have resulted in a highly negative assessment of the region’s economic
prospects. The most important broad change in living standards reported by several
interviewees was also negative. Interviewees from business, NGOs and the public sector
all mentioned the negative impact of inflated housing prices during the days of Shtokman
mania, a development which was not matched by employment and salary growth: ‘‘Just
say the word Shtokman and apartment prices go up’’ (Interview 9, also 3, 18, 20).
Secondly, and more significantly, respondents’ experience with and perceptions of
the petroleum companies’ CSR efforts seems to have catalysed a changed under-
standing of the broader web of potential economic development stakeholders in the
region. The interviewees’ understanding and (self) assessment of the responsibilities,
capacities and rights of various categories of stakeholders in managing the broader
environmental and social risks and opportunities brought by new forms of economic
development are reviewed below.
Industry
On the whole, respondents retained fairly strong recollections of the social policies
and efforts of the companies that had vied for positions in the Shtokman project.
Some interviewees were able to list concrete initiatives included as part of the
companies’ social policies. For example, one NGO-representative mentioned that
‘‘. . . Rosneft had many social projects, like ‘‘Best Yard in Town’’ and Total brought
opera singers and ballet to town. Statoil loved cultural projects too  exhibitions,
Grieg music’’ (Interview 12), while a representative from a large company recalled a
scholarship program, support of sporting events and excursions for residents of
Teriberka as key CSR initiatives (Interview 6).
Several interviewees demonstrated a more general disillusionment about the
promise of new ‘‘big business’’ in the region and placed emphasis on basic tenets of
corporate citizenship (job provision, paying taxes, following legislation), rather than
extensive social and environmental programs or CSR initiatives (Interviews 16, 2,
15, 20). One NGO-representative put it this way:
You just need to give people a chance to work and then guarantee them that the job
will be there tomorrow and the day after tomorrow. That is social policy. We grew
up in the Soviet Union where fairness was an actual concern (Interview 10).
The question of taxation was another particularly sore point, with several
interviewees referring to a process in which extractive companies that were pushed
too hard on any of the three points above (employment, regulations, taxation) would
simply ‘‘re-register’’ their tax home in another, laxer region while continuing their
operations locally (Interviews 1, 16, 18).
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Other respondents demonstrated a sceptical or uncertain attitude about the actual
outcomes of CSR, wondering if it had been just PR or empty words to satisfy company
policy (Interviewee 10, small business representative). A typical interviewee put it this
way, ‘‘maybe the companies do a lot  they sure say a lot. But it gets lost somewhere up
high’’ (Interview 5). Another interviewee from the public sector put it this way, ‘‘We have
CSR on paper only. I wish companies understood that they have a responsibility not only
to their managers and owners  but to all of us who live here’’ (Interview 19). In terms of
the environment, some interviewees were sceptical about the sincerity of company
efforts. One government employee (1) took this view: ‘‘it’s fashionable to throw a lot of
time and effort into ecological projects’’. One small-business employee put it this way:
‘‘every solid company has a policy of environmental protection that they go around
blabbing about’’ (Interview 7).
Whether the interviewees’ had negative, positive or neutral recollections of these
concrete petroleum company CSR practices, we observed that, for nearly all
interviewees, the memories and current perceptions of the major economic actors
that established themselves in the region during the Soviet period were an important
conceptual touchstone. These longstanding industrial actors (mining and metal-
lurgy, shipbuilding, nuclear power plants) were held up as the standard against which
the social performance of the ‘‘newcomer’’ petroleum companies was judged.
Interviewees from all walks of life warmly recited past and present benefits and
services provided by the companies to their employees  entertainment and
celebrations, travel, pensioner housing, specialized medical care, education and
other family benefits (Interviews 2; 12; 17; 18; 13).
Another government employee put it this way: ‘‘I grew up in the Soviet Union and
remember. . .that the basic goal of large companies was not making a profit, but
supporting their workers and families. . .Of course, you had to fulfil your [produc-
tion] plan, but this is something different’’ (Interview 2). Another interviewee from
the NGO sector suggested that ‘‘Soviet CSR’’ was much like what one could expect
from a proper CSR policy today:
I grew up in Monchegorsk [one of the metallurgical centres] and as a kid knew who
the director of the factory was, but not the head administrator of town. There were
good kindergartens and schools, organized trips and excursions to the factory. This
was not called CSR then, but the form was the same even if the name was different
(Interview 12).
This focus on employees as key beneficiaries of industry suggests that one element of
the social contract between business and society in Russia is an emphasis on a
company’s relationship with its employees and their families, as opposed to a broader
societal emphasis. Within this relationship, expectations are high regarding what a
company should provide. Renewed appreciation of the industries and practices
established during the Soviet period and a general disillusionment with and scepticism





Regional authorities interviewed had come to understand themselves as limited in holding
any large economic actor to account in social and environmental matters. As one put it:
We do not have much influence, although they do need our presence and cooperation,
and to promote a good image of themselves in the region. For example, if we invite them
to participate in our major activities, like ‘‘Murmansk Business Week’’ they will support
a children’s drawing contest or some kind of effort for the youth (Interview 8).
In the words of another petroleum-involved regional public servant:
The development of this sector is carried out by companies of federal significance.
Because of this, many of the strategic decisions about them are taken in Moscow. It is
difficult for me to determine to what extent regional powers can influence these to
help and facilitate the implementation of the decisions made at the very top
level. . .There are a huge number of tasks that need to be carried out at the regional
and local levels, we have to create the conditions for building commercial interests,
infrastructure, roads. . .not least the right social conditions. We know the region best
and a lot of these tasks can be carried out by us more efficiently and quickly (Interview
1, similar to interviews 3 and 16).
Furthermore, the issue of companies re-registering their tax home, as discussed
above, caused the regional government to focus on ‘‘hospitality’’, ‘‘maximum
comfort’’ and ‘‘being appealing’’ for business (interviews 1,3, 4 respectively), rather
than pushing for high social and environmental standards.
Civil society and the public
Environmental organizations’ engagement with stakeholder discussions and CSR
practices connected with the Shtokman field seem to have been largely empowering
in how they envisioned their role in regional economic development. They saw
themselves as having been important participants in shaping industrial development
in the region. Overall the organizations felt that their engagement with the companies
involved had been constructive, even while they maintained a vigilant attitude toward
the same companies (Interview 16, 17).
An important lesson learned by NGO involvement in Shtokman planning and
discussion seems to be a greater appreciation of the importance and utility of
international financing regulations and standards in generating accountability and
leverage. For example, the need to be eligible for international financing was reported as
a motivating factor in sharpening environmental routines. Another interviewee put it this
way: ‘‘Private companies in Russia are seen as more pro-CSR as they have to compete all
over the world and more difficult conditions force them to do more and they are more
influenced by international practices. But all companies seek to economize, and when
they can work with less costs they will economize’’ (Interview 16).
One interview was conducted with a representative of an indigenous organization
visiting Murmansk. Here, our geographical focus on Murmansk is limiting, as most
Sami organizations representing the approximately 2000 Sami people in the region
are headquartered in villages elsewhere on the Kola Peninsula.25 This interviewee
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painted a worrying picture, arguing that Sami had not been effectively consulted in
terms of commercial developments and felt they were being negatively affected by
industrial development in subtle ways (Interview 11). Another striking feature in the
interview set relating to indigenous organizations is that several of the other
stakeholders interviewed had negative views on how Sami organizations had
participated in debates on Shtokman, describing them as disorganized and motivated
by pecuniary concerns alone (Interview 1, 2, 12, 13, 16).
A final stakeholder independently mentioned by many interviewees was the public 
or, more accurately, individual regional residents. The Shtokman project seems to have
generated a new understanding of the power of citizens  or lack thereof. For example,
in the words of one civil servant:
Putin has been talking about the social responsibilities of business for a long time,
but this is nonsense because business is not separate from society. . .it’s difficult to
require businesses to be socially responsible, while at the same time our society is so
simple/petty (khamskoe). They are hooligans and we are hooligans. . ..we can’t even
properly sort our trash. We can’t start with CSR but rather need to grow citizens’
social responsibility. . .if there was a societal understanding of responsibility, we
would also have corporate responsibility (Interview 9).
On a related note, a business sector employee argued that citizens do not know
what to ask for ‘‘our consciousness is absolutely unformed. This is the biggest
problem’’ (Interview 7).
Summary of changes in stakeholder understandings
Here, we see that the Shtokman gas project and the advance CSR engagement of
companies was generative of new understandings  positive, negative and neutral  of
selves and others and divisions of responsibility. General perceptions of new companies
were fairly negative, while an appreciation of established industry was set in even higher
relief in contrast. Regional authorities had the takeaway lesson that their primary
contribution to challenges and opportunities in economic development was to act as
positively as possible to encourage businesses to come  and stay  in the region.
Environmental organizations felt empowered and educated by the process, whereas the
indigenous organization represented in the interview sample argued that the Sami
onshore concerns and rights had been disrespected. The question remains, of course,
of how these new relations between and perceptions of economic development
stakeholders in the region will be brought to bear on debating, planning and
anticipating the next economic development ‘‘future’’ of the region.
Concluding thoughts
Shtokman remains an unrealized ‘‘megaproject’’. The results of the exploratory
qualitative interview set presented above show that interviewees nonetheless possessed
well-developed expectations and perceptions of the oil and gas companies that had
jockeyed for positions in connection with the Shtokman gas field in the Barents Sea.
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They also demonstrated a renewed appreciation of existing industry in the region and
of ‘‘Soviet CSR’’ (even those companies with worrying environmental records).
The experience of having been ‘‘virtual’’ CSR/petroleum development stakeholders
also seems to have generated some lasting, new understandings of interviewees’ own
and others’ potential roles and responsibilities. This illustrates how the anticipatory
practices related to an unrealized petroleum future  hearings, public statements,
media pieces, dinner table conversations  resulted in an important cognitive imprint
on the ‘‘unbuilt landscape’’ of industrialism of the Kola Peninsula.
The material traces of advance oil and gas infrastructure and CSR projects are also
likely to have shaped regional planning/budgetary/policy processes and the physical
landscape to some degree. To explore other aspects left by this unrealized petroleum
future  such as physical imprints on the landscape and changed policy planning
processes and individual outlooks  additional interviews, comparative mapping and
analysis of budgetary and infrastructure planning in coastal communities along the
Barents Sea would be an important avenue for further research.
This article argues that anticipatory practices in connection with the Shtokman
field have had lasting repercussions for how economic development and environ-
mental risks are understood in the region and for shaping understandings of what
kinds of stakeholders matter for large-scale economic development. The article’s
conceptual framework, drawn from geography and science and technology studies,
indicates a new avenue for Arctic social science research on the lasting impacts of
anticipatory practices and representations of the future (even those that do not come
to fruition). Our understanding of the political and economic geography of the Arctic
more broadly  Greenland or the USA/Alaska  is likely to remain incomplete if we
do not direct additional scholarly attention to the unbuilt environments of oil and gas
megaprojects. ‘‘Ghost projects’’ like Shtokman are likely to shape the dispositions,
policy trajectories, and stakeholder patterns that Arctic residents bring to upcoming
debates about circumpolar economic and social development.
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